

## **Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq**

This report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13.

The report is divided into two sections corresponding to those identified in the Conference Report. The initial section of the report focuses on Stability and Security in Iraq and enumerates goals and progress regarding Iraq’s political stability, security environment, and economic progress.

The second section of the report, on Security Force Training and Performance, provides indicators of the training and development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the forces of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the police and other paramilitary forces of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

A classified annex to this report will address U.S. military requirements and various possible force rotations, and classified data concerning security force training and performance.

The U.S. Government places emphasis on the development of metrics that allows the Iraqi Government to assess progress toward the objectives of the strategy for Iraq. The U.S. Government’s objectives include:

- transitioning to security self-reliance;
- supporting freedom and democracy;
- providing essential services;
- establishing the foundation for a strong economy;
- promoting the rule of law;
- maintaining international engagement and support; and
- promoting strategic communications.

Through a collaborative, interagency approach, performance metrics have been developed to measure progress towards these objectives. Data relating to Iraq’s political, security, and economic spheres of activity are collected from both Iraqi and U.S. sources, including Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the U.S. Mission in Iraq. The Joint Staff coordinates collection and compilation of data for the security objective within its Assessment and Integration Center. U.S. Government staff from relevant agencies of the executive branch regularly review and assess trends in the data relative to the objectives and provide assessments for review by the Deputies and the Principals of the relevant executive departments and agencies and the National Security Council.

This report reflects measures and indicators currently in use in this interagency process. These metrics are a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves; they are routinely reviewed and

revised to ensure that they remain useful in assessing progress on objectives. As new performance indicators are developed, they will be reflected in future reports.

## **Stability and Security in Iraq**

### *Political Stability*


The ultimate goal of the transitional political process is for Iraq to be governed by an effective and representative democratic system that is: supported by the Iraqi people; capable of exercising responsibility for managing Iraq's affairs, including security; accepted as legitimate by the international community; and committed to promoting civil society, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

To achieve this goal, the U.S. objective is to support critical components of the continuing evolution of a free and democratic Iraq, including:

- supporting the on-schedule Iraqi drafting of a constitution, followed by a constitutional referendum and elections; and
- supporting Iraqi efforts to ensure that all communities accept and participate in the political process.

One key measure of progress towards the establishment of a constitutional and democratic government in Iraq is therefore the timeline and political process set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of March 2004 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004). The most recent milestone in this process was the overwhelmingly successful election this past January 30 for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Upcoming markers of progress toward democracy include a draft constitution scheduled to be completed in August and a nationwide referendum to approve that constitution in October. If the constitution is approved by a majority of Iraqi voters, and not rejected by two-thirds of voters in three or more of Iraq's eighteen governorates, elections for a permanent Iraqi government are to be held in December 2005, and the permanent Iraqi government is to take power shortly thereafter. The following graph illustrates the timeline of the democratic process in Iraq, as set forth in the TAL and UNSCR 1546:

# Progress toward a Democratic Iraq



This process is on track as demonstrated by the January 30 election and successful formation of the TNA and the Iraqi Transitional Government; the process is winning the support of all Iraqi constituencies. Most recently, the TNA formally welcomed Sunni Arab members into the committee that is now drafting Iraq's constitution. This move, in addition to naming Sunni Arabs to several ministerial posts, permits Iraq's Sunni Arab community to participate in the political transition process despite threats of violence and intimidation in some Iraqi provinces. This outreach to the mainstream Sunni Arab community is part of the strategy to isolate the violent extremists politically, even as the ISF and MNF-I hunt them down militarily. Although the TAL allows for one six-month extension of this political process, Iraqis close to the constitutional process have consistently stated that they intend to meet the August 15 deadline by completing a final draft constitution that represents a consensus of Iraq's diverse geography and ethnicity.

In light of the above, it is not surprising that Iraqi support for the political process continues to grow. According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute in 15 of Iraq's 18 governorates in the first week of March, 61.5 percent of Iraqis believe the country is headed in the right direction, up from 52.1 percent in the week before the January 30 election. Looking ahead to the constitutional process, more than 56 percent of Iraqis know that the TNA is responsible for writing a permanent constitution. This number is up from 32.9 percent recorded in the November/December 2004 poll. Finally, 52.6 percent understood that the constitution drafted by the TNA will have to be approved by a national referendum later in the year.

Like the Iraqi people, the international community is increasingly supportive of Iraq's transition to democracy. Unanimous UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 (2003), 1511 (2003), and 1546 (2004) undergird the transition, and international support for that process is having results. The UN is actively supporting the constitutional development process, with a team of experts resident in Baghdad to provide technical assistance as requested by the Iraqi government. The UN also continues to provide assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, which is preparing for the constitutional referendum and nationwide elections later this year. In June 2005, the United States and the European Union jointly sponsored an international conference in Brussels at which the Iraqi government presented its political, security and economic agenda. On July 18, 2005, Jordan hosted an international donors' conference to build upon the 2003 Madrid Conference, at which \$13.6 billion was pledged (by non-U.S. sources, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 37 bilateral donors) to Iraqi reconstruction and development.

In a February 2005 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all 26 Allies agreed to contribute to NATO's training of the ISF, either in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions, and/or by donations of equipment. NATO has declared that the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) has reached initial operating capability.

## *Security Environment*

The ultimate goal of the transitional security process is for the Iraqis to take ownership of their own security. To achieve this goal, the Coalition is focused on these objectives:

- increasing the capacity of Iraqi security structures and forces;
- reducing the influence and effectiveness of insurgents; and
- strengthening Iraqi rule of law capabilities – law enforcement, justice, and the corrections system.

The ISF have continued to make progress. We assess their progress with several indicators:

- progress on the Multinational Security Transitional Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) program of training and equipping units and individuals in MOD and MOI forces.
- Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) of operational units conducted through Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Coalition Military Transition Teams embedded at the battalion, brigade, and division level units for the Iraqi Army; Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) with MOI's Special Police Commando battalions and Civil Intervention Forces; and partnership at the provincial levels with the Iraqi police forces.

These indicators are further addressed in subsequent sections on Security Forces Training and Performance.


One noteworthy strategic indicator of progress toward a stable security environment has been the inability of insurgents to derail the political process and timeline. To do so is the strategic objective of the insurgents, and they are failing to achieve it. The insurgents, however, do remain capable, adaptable, and intent on carrying out attacks against Iraqi civilians and officials as well as security forces. Insurgents share a goal of expelling the Coalition from Iraq and destabilizing and de-legitimizing the Iraqi government in order to pursue their individual and, at times, conflicting goals. Iraqi Sunnis make up the largest proportion of the insurgency and present the most significant threat to stability in Iraq. Radical Shia groups, violent extremists, criminals, and, to a lesser degree, foreign fighters, make up the rest. Although violent extremist activity accounts for a fraction of the overall violence, the dramatic and symbolic nature and lethality of their attacks, combined with effective information operations, has a disproportionate psychological impact relative to their numbers.

Some sectarian violence has captured attention since the January 2005 election with reports of killings often including victims' religious affiliations. Classification of violence as "sectarian" is frequently a matter of perception; it is often difficult to differentiate between attacks on citizens in general (including local or tribal vendettas) and those specifically targeting members of a particular sect. A mid-May spate of killings of clerics increased tension between Shia and Sunni Arabs; however, public accusations from both sides have not indicated clear motives for the assassinations. To their credit, prominent Shia and Sunni clerics have condemned such attacks openly, taken public stands against inciting sectarian violence, and called for calm. These statements against revenge killings have encouraged restraint on the part of both Shia and Sunni communities on the whole.


The following charts on overall attack trends indicate that the:

- total number of incidents has been relatively level in the post-election period and remains below the election peaks; and
- attacks are concentrated largely in four of Iraq's 18 provinces.

**Average Weekly Attacks by Time Period**  
1 Jan 04- 24 Jun 05




**Percentage of Attacks by Province**



The number of monthly attacks on Iraq’s infrastructure, such as electricity generation and oil facilities, has decreased since the election, but continue to have an adverse impact on electricity transmission and oil exports. The Iraqi Government, with Coalition support, is leading an increased effort to enhance infrastructure security, such as hardening key nodes and expanding the number and capabilities of personnel guarding pipelines.

## Infrastructure Attacks

*Monthly Average by Time Period*



Additional progress toward a stable security environment has come through efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq. The U.S. Embassy in Iraq is promoting the rule of law through the State Department Bureau of International Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (INL) comprehensive, integrated Rule of Law concept. This concept is a strategic approach to justice reform and rule of law development, which has enabled the Embassy to identify and fund priority activities that contribute to the broader goals of defeating the insurgency, promoting stability and security, and supporting democratic governance. The Embassy/INL has also coordinated its rule of law assistance with the international community to avoid overlap, fill gaps, and ensure efficient use of resources. The Embassy/INL has worked closely with the EU to de-conflict and coordinate similar justice integration programs. The focus of such efforts has turned most recently towards working with Iraqis in strategic planning to identify and define an Iraqi vision and priorities for promoting justice reform and rule of law. The primary measure of success is establishment of an effective and fair justice system oriented toward international standards.

### *Economic Activity*

The goal continues to be to assist the Iraqi Government in establishing the foundation for a strong economy and in delivering essential services. This includes:

- helping promote the growth of the Iraqi economy in a manner consistent with Iraq's compliance with the IMF and Iraq's international agreements;
- supporting development of a strong private sector;
- assisting in developing and implementing policies and programs that will reduce unemployment;
- assisting in increasing the production and export of oil; production and delivery of electricity; and other essential services; and
- helping to ensure the security of the oil, electricity and water infrastructure.

Assisting the Iraqis achieve their economic objectives is central to attaining the ultimate goal of a stable, unified, and prosperous Iraq. Although significant challenges remain, there has been progress on a number of fronts. Performance metrics tracked by the State Department's Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) include both macroeconomic indicators and specific indicators in key sectors and services.

### *Macroeconomic Indicators*

In cooperation with the IMF, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) is implementing an economic reform program, including fiscal and monetary policy reforms, which will lay the foundation for strong, stable economic growth. Iraq's fiscal outlook has improved as a result of the Paris Club debt forgiveness agreement. Macroeconomic indicators include:

- The introduction of a stable currency, the new Iraqi Dinar, unified Iraq's divided currency zones and has enabled the Central Bank of Iraq to better manage inflationary pressures.
- Although unemployment of approximately 28% (as reported by the Iraqi government) remains a concern, new business formation is laying the groundwork for future gains in private sector employment.
- The U.S. is contributing to the expansion of private sector activity with programs that provide microfinance loans, bank lending to small and medium sized enterprises, capital market development, business skills development, vocational training, investment promotion, business center support, and establishment of economic zones.

<b>Macroeconomic Indicators</b>	Dec 2004	Mar 2005	April 2005	May 2005	June 2005
Inflation (Monthly % Changes in Consumer Price Index)	5.4	13.9	-6.0	0.0	-2.1
Currency (New Iraqi Dinars per USD)	1460	1460	1460	1476	1471
Unemployment (%)	22.5	22.5	26.8	26.8	28.0
New Business Registrations (cumulative in thousands)	18.1	25.1	26.0	26.8	27.8


Source: Department of State, June 29,2005

### *Sector Indicators*

#### Oil Infrastructure

Crude oil production and exports remain at about 2.1 and 1.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d), respectively. The production level is below the peak of 2.54 million bbl/d achieved in September 2004 because of operations, maintenance, and security problems. The ITG is attempting to address some of these problems with a capital budget that provides for funding in-field development and production facilities, pipelines for refining and export, increases to refining capacity, and infrastructure security.

#### **Oil Production (million barrels per day)**




Source: Department of State, June 29,2005

## Electricity

The summer 2005 goal for daily load served of 110,000 MWh (seven-day average) has been met. Demand for electricity is growing faster than production, however, and the Iraqi Government will need to prioritize the rationalization of electricity tariffs, which are now a fraction of the estimated cost of service. Once price signals are instituted, Iraq's Ministry of Electricity will be in a stronger position to mobilize domestic and foreign investment, beyond what the United States and other donor nations have provided. To ensure the sustainability of electricity generation and delivery, the Iraqi Government will also need to prioritize operations and maintenance capacity building within the Ministry of Electricity. Through weekly meetings of ministries related to energy (Oil, Electricity, Water Resources, Finance, and Defense), inter-ministerial coordination is improving; however, an integrated energy plan, the availability of appropriate fuels for Iraq's gas turbine generation facilities, and infrastructure security remain outstanding issues.

**Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq Since January 2004**



Source: Department of State, June 29, 2005

## Communications

The communications sector is expanding rapidly. The three major cell phone companies continue to enroll subscribers at healthy rates. As of June 2005, there were 2.7 million active cell phone subscribers in Iraq. The number of internet subscribers more than doubled since June 2004, and the number of landline subscribers has increased as well. A wireless broadband network linking 35 Iraqi government sites is nearly complete, thereby greatly improving intra-governmental communications.

<b>Communications</b>	Transition To IIG 6/28/04	Dec 2004	Mar 2005	April 2005	May 2005	June 2005
Landline subscribers (thousands, cumulative)	794.2	960.1	982.6	997.7	997.7	997.7
Internet Subscribers (thousands, cumulative)	70.0	120.0	140.3	157.4	160.9	168.5
Cell Phone Subscribers (thousands, cumulative)	489.0	1383.8	1797.2	2143.2	2422.1	2683.0

Source: Department of State, June 29,2005

### *Criteria for Withdrawing Forces*

As President Bush has repeatedly stated, U.S. forces will withdraw from Iraq as soon as the mission is successfully accomplished. Success will be achieved when there is a free Iraq in which Iraqis themselves are the guarantors of their own liberty and security. We have consistently made it clear that the criteria for withdrawing Coalition forces from Iraq are conditions-based, not calendar-based. The development of the ISF to a level at which they can take over primary responsibility for their own security is the threshold condition. ISF development in turn, will be helped by progress in political, economic, and other areas.

Among the other conditions that will support and hasten success is the continued reconciliation of the various ethnic communities in Iraq. The various groups within the Iraqi body politic have made impressive progress towards coexistence and political compromise. This can have an important impact on the security situation.

The international community is increasingly aware of the stakes involved in aiding Iraq. The U.S.-EU sponsored international conference recently held in Brussels elicited strong political statements of support for the emerging Iraqi democracy. As discussed earlier in this report, the UN and NATO have also recently increased their commitments to helping the Iraqis build stability and security. These trends are encouraging, and the international community will need to continue to match its words with its deeds.

Finally, any discussion of the conditions that must be met for Iraq to assume its rightful place among the free nations of the world must not overlook the attitudes, policies, and actions of Iraq's neighbors. The continuing stream of foreign terrorists entering Iraq is seriously retarding the development of a stable and secure Iraq.

## Security Forces Training and Performance

The Iraqi Government, working with Coalition forces, has identified a force structure to meet Iraq's need for internal security and, eventually, protection from external aggression. The majority of the forces for this structure have been recruited, have completed individual entry training, and are equipped with basic equipment. Iraqi forces are making progress in developing individual and unit capabilities, and Iraqis are increasingly taking over responsibility for their country's security.

Even as the Coalition helps build and train ISF, their forces are being operationally employed in active combat operations. Military units that are not yet capable of fully independent operations are capable of fighting in support of or in conjunction with Coalition military forces. Available data indicates that more than 2,000 ISF personnel have been killed in action.

The status of Iraqi forces is assessed through indicators of:

- progress on the program of training and equipping units and individuals of the MOD and MOI forces; and
- readiness assessments of operational units.

Just as the Department of Defense should not and must not disclose the precise equipment, training, and readiness data for U.S. military units, such precise data are similarly classified for Iraqi forces. The enemy's knowledge of such details would put both Iraqi and Coalition forces at increased risk. Tables showing this data are therefore in the classified annex of this report.

### *Current Status of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces*

<u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>		<u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	
COMPONENT	OPERATIONAL	COMPONENT	TRAINED & EQUIPPED
ARMY	~76,700	POLICE	~63,400
AIR FORCE	~100	HIGHWAY PATROL	
NAVY	~500	OTHER MOI FORCES	~30,600
TOTAL	~77,300	TOTAL	~94,000

**Total Trained & Equipped ISF:**

**~171,300**

Data as of 4 July 05

## *Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) Forces*

**Army.** MNF-I has implemented a structured training and assessment process for Iraqi Military Forces. Training for the individual soldier is divided into two areas: training for new recruits and training for former soldiers. Training for new recruits takes a total of nine weeks and has usually been conducted at the Iraqi Training Brigade (ITB) in Kirkush. Training for former soldiers lasts three to four weeks and has usually been conducted in divisional locations with graduates generally being assigned to the division that trains them. All personnel receive standard infantry-style training; selected soldiers receive specialized training in Army Military Occupational Specialties, such as Signal, Administration, Supply, Armor, Transport, Maintenance and Military Police.

Membership in the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade requires additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers undergo a three-week Assessment and Selection course. Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces (ICTF) soldiers receive 12 weeks of training in Jordan on Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Planning, and Leadership before they conduct Direct Action missions. ISOF soldiers undergo rigorous training emphasizing small unit tactics, counterterrorism, and unit self-reliance. Improved qualification and vetting standards minimize absenteeism and the risk of insurgent infiltration. The Brigade's chain of command and officer cadre are assessed as being very effective. ISOF elements have been conducting operations for the past year. They have played crucial roles in major combat operations along side of, and sometimes independently of, Coalition forces.

A small number of Army personnel attend advanced training with NATO and U.S. Army schools.




MNF-I has also implemented, in partnership with the MOD, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units' operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership. The table on the following page depicts the TRA report format used for the Iraqi Army.

Overall, operational units are assessed as:

- capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independent of Coalition forces (Level 1);
- capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition enablers (Level 2); or
- capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations only when operating alongside Coalition units (Level 3).
- Level 1, 2, and 3 units are all engaged in operations against the enemy.

As with U.S. Army data, the specific evaluation data for ISF are classified. A rollup assessment of Iraqi Army unit capabilities is provided in the classified annex to this report.

**Transition Readiness Assessment (Page 1 of 2)**

<b>1. Personnel</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b>		
Overall Manning (assigned-On Hand)	 < 50% of auth manning	 50-69% of auth manning	 70-84% of auth manning	 ≥85% of auth manning
Staff Manning	< 50% of Staff manned	50-69% of Staff manned	70-84% of Staff manned	≥85% of Staff manned
Officer/NCO Manning	< 50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	≥85% of auth manning
Pay	Unable to pay troops	Pay System Established	Personnel paid according to pay grade	Personnel consistently paid for 3 months
<b>2. Command &amp; Control</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b>		
Intelligence	 No Intelligence capability	 BN/BDE able to process, analyze, disseminate info	 Participates in decision-making; develops enemy COAs	 BDE/BN able to Implement R&S Plan; conduct Intel based ops
Operations	No operational capability	BN/BDE able to establish TOC; Maintains situational awareness	BN/BDE able to send and receive reports/orders from higher/lower echelons	BN/BDE Staff able to conduct Troop Leading Procedures
Communications	No ability to communicate	BN/BDE able to establish/maintain internal communications	BN/BDE able to maintain external communications with higher	•BN/BDE able to sustain ext commo for 7 days •Has capable and sustained ALT commo
<b>3. Training</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b>		
METL	 Achieves proficiency in <50% of all METL tasks	 Achieves proficiency 50%-69% of all METL tasks	 Achieves proficiency 70-84% of all METL tasks	 Achieves proficiency ≥ 85% of all METL tasks
<b>4. Sustainment/Logistics</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b>		
Supply (I, III, V, IX)	 Secure/Store supplies	 Account/Issue Items	 Forecast/Requisition supplies	 Maintain Stockage level (UBL)
Infrastructure	Temporary Billeting	Statement of Work/Construction has begun	Minimal billeting, administrative and perimeter security infrastructure	Adequate billeting, administrative, mess, motor pool and perimeter security infrastructure
Maintenance	No Maint. conducted	•Conducts PMCS •Reports equipment status	•Conducts 1 <sup>st</sup> echelon repair. •Requests repair parts. •30% maintenance personnel MOS qualified	•Establish maintenance program and reporting procedures. •50% maintenance personnel MOS qualified
<b>MNC-I FORM DATED 15JUN05</b>				

**Transition Readiness Assessment (Page 2 of 2)**

<b>5. Equipment</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>		
<b>EQUIPMENT ON HAND</b>				
Weapons	< 50% of authorization	50-69% of authorization	70-84% of authorization	≥ 85% of authorization
Vehicles	< 50% of authorization	50-69% of authorization	70-84% of authorization	≥ 85% of authorization
Commo	< 50% of authorization	50-69% of authorization	70-84% of authorization	≥ 85% of authorization
<b>OPERATIONAL READINESS</b>				
Weapons	< 50% OR	50-69% of OR	70-84% OR	≥ 85% OR
Vehicles	< 50% OR	50-69% of OR	70-84% OR	≥ 85% OR
Commo	< 50% OR	50-69% of OR	70-84% OR	≥ 85% OR

<b>6. Leadership</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>		
Leaders are rated as "capable" by supervisor				
	< 50% of leaders	50-69% of leaders	70-84% of leaders	≥ 85% of leaders

**7. Subjective Assessment:**

Annotate total number of pages attached to this report. See supplemental instructions for required categories. Supplement to Tab G Appendix 1 to Annex C to MNCI Operations Order 05-02. **Pages attached**

**Transition Readiness Assessment**

-  A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
-  A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.
-  A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
-  A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

**This Unit is Currently Assessed at Level and will be ready to assume battle space in \_\_\_\_\_ months.**

It is useful to place these readiness assessments in perspective. The first Iraqi Army infantry battalions finished basic training in early 2004 and were immediately required in combat without complete equipment. They had inadequate time to develop unit cohesiveness, staff proficiency, and a leadership chain of command that is fundamental to a military unit. Ministry of Defense forces did not perform well in Fallujah—several battalions collapsed. Absent-without-leave (AWOL) rates among regular army units were in double digits and remained so for the rest of the year.

Although such problems have not been entirely solved, they have been addressed in large measure because of the ability to put to good use the security sector funding from the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF) as provided for by Public Law 108-106. Equipment shortages have been reduced as equipment procured with U.S.-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004. The Iraqi Army now has 60 percent of its total authorized equipment, including more than 100 percent of AK-47 requirements. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), as provided for by Public Law 109-13, will further enable MNF-I to meet critical requirements. Furthermore, although there is variance in the rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion among the Iraqi Army, rates have diminished significantly and are now around one percent for some divisions. Still, units that are conducting operations and units that relocate elsewhere in Iraq experience a surge in absenteeism.

U.S.-funded procurement has equipped infantry units primarily with former Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. The MOD, using its funds, has also sought U.S.-standard vehicles such as HMMWVs and M-113 armored personnel carriers. Mechanized forces are being trained using T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1s and MTLBs. The ISOF is currently equipped with M4 carbines, M9 pistols, night-vision devices, M24 sniper systems, M240 machine guns, 12 gauge shotguns, 50-caliber machine guns, global positioning systems equipment, and surveillance equipment.

**Navy.** The Iraqi Navy is currently executing operational missions that include border and waterway protection from smuggling and infiltration, and site protection of port and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrols out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf using using 27-meter patrol boats, rigid-hull inflatable boats, and other support vessels. The Iraqi Navy currently has approximately 500 trained sailors on duty. It is equipped with five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Duel Outboard Engines), 10 rigid-hull inflatable boats, and various small arms and night vision devices. The Iraqi Navy will further equip themselves with six Al Faw Class Patrol Boats (the first of which was delivered in July 2005) and two Off-Shore Support Vessels. With some exceptions, the responsibility for logistical support of the Iraqi Navy has been handed over to the Umm Qasr Base Support Unit (BSU). Maritime and Riverine Advisory Support Team (M&R AST) members provide advice and assistance to both the BSU and the Iraqi Navy Logistics Department in order to cultivate a cooperative working relationship. It is anticipated (based on progression along the CTF-58 assessment program) that the Iraqi Navy will assume point defense responsibilities of the oil terminals by September 30, 2005. Assumption of the waterside mission (the afloat defensive screen) is dependent on the acquisition and initial operational readiness of the six Al Faw class

The Iraqi Navy Training Department currently conducts all of its own training, assisted by the M&R AST. All members of the Iraqi Navy received their initial training in Kirkush. Following basic training, they were trained on mission-focused technical skill sets: ship handling, marlin spike seamanship, navigation, engineering, weapons handling, small boat operations, shipboard damage control, etc.

**Air Force.** Like the Army and the Navy, the Iraqi Air Force is conducting operational missions while equipping and training. The Iraqi Air Force's counterinsurgency missions focus on aerial observation /surveillance and air transportation. The Air Force currently has over 100 personnel and has a fleet of 9 helicopters (4 UH-1H and 5 Jet Ranger), 3 C-130s, and 8 single-engine propeller-driven observation airplanes (6 CompAir turboprop aircraft and 2 Seeker piston aircraft). There are 19 Iraqi C-130 personnel currently being trained in the United States. Language training and flight training are being conducted at Al Ali Air Base. Crews have previously trained in Jordan on the UH-1H and Seeker.

**Recruitment and Vetting.** Recruiting for the Iraqi Armed Forces is done through national recruiting centers spread throughout the country. The goal is a diversified force that mirrors national ethnic and religious demographics and whose allegiance is to the Republic of Iraq rather than a particular province, ethnic, or tribal group. Consequently, all recruits sign a national service contract and must agree to serve anywhere in the Republic of Iraq based on mission needs and requirements. The extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. A vetting process is used to attempt to screen out criminals, foreign and anti-Iraq forces.

#### *Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) Forces*

The Ministry of Interior's forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, Highway Patrol, Border Police, Civil Intervention Force and Emergency Response Unit, and the Special Police Commandos.

MOI Civil Intervention Forces (CIF), Emergency Response Units (ERU), and Special Police Commando Battalions are evaluated using a TRA process that is similar to that used for MOD forces. MNC-I Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) are embedded with the MOI's Special Police Commando battalions and CIF. The SPTT criteria are similar to those of the MOD forces. Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. In lieu of the TRA, police partnership assessments look at factors that are more tailored to the tasks of a police force. More than half of provincial police headquarters currently are assessed to have control in their province.

The following tables depict the format of TRAs used for MOI forces.

**IPS Transition Readiness Assessment (Page 1 of 2)**

<b>1. Personnel</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
% On Duty of Authorized	% of IPS On Duty being Paid	
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

<b>2. Training</b>				<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
Basic/TIP	Sustainment	Integration	Advanced	
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

<b>3. Leadership</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
Leadership <input type="radio"/>	Neutrality <input type="radio"/>	
Situational Awareness <input type="radio"/>	Duty <input type="radio"/>	
Communications <input type="radio"/>	Morale <input type="radio"/>	

<b>4. Station Effectiveness</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
Patrol/Traffic Operations <input type="radio"/>	Intelligence Management <input type="radio"/>	
Detainee Operations <input type="radio"/>	Equipment Accountability <input type="radio"/>	
Case Management <input type="radio"/>	Budget Management <input type="radio"/>	

<b>5. Force Protection</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
Trained Response Team <input type="radio"/>	Blast Protection <input type="radio"/>	
Entry and Access Control <input type="radio"/>	Guards Posted <input type="radio"/>	

<b>6. Facilities Infrastructure</b>		<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b> <input type="radio"/>
Power/Emergency Power <input type="radio"/>	Sanitation <input type="radio"/>	
Water <input type="radio"/>	% of IPS Stations Functional <input type="radio"/>	

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**IPS Transition Readiness Assessment (Page 2 of 2)**

**7. Equipment**

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Vehicles	Radios	Pistols (Glocks)	Rifles (AK-47s)	Heavy W(PKM)	Ammo
<input type="radio"/>					

Uniforms	Body Armor	Helmets	Police ID
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**8. Insurgent Activity Against IPS**

Station Attacks	IPS KIA	IPS WIA

<b>Legend</b>	
	Effective ≥85%
	Effective with Limitations 70% to 84%
	Effective with Considerable Limitations 50% to 69%
	Not Effective <50%

**Provincial Operational Capability**

-  A Level 1 province has police stations fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent police operations.
-  A Level 2 province has police stations capable of planning, executing, and sustaining police operations with coalition support.
-  A Level 3 province has police stations partially capable of conducting police operations in conjunction with coalition units.
-  A Level 4 province has police stations incapable of conducting police operations

**This Station is Currently Assessed at Level**

**The amount of months until this IPS unit is fully capable, level 1 is \_\_\_\_\_**

**The amount of months until this IPS unit is Capable, level 2 is \_\_\_\_\_**

**Iraqi Police Service.** Some 62,000 trained police were on duty as of late June 2005. To date, over 35,000 police recruits have completed the 8-week basic police classroom training, and more than 35,500 veteran police have received the 3-week Transition Integration Program (TIP) training. Over 13,500 police personnel have completed specialized training, such as fingerprinting, explosive ordnance disposal, investigations, and counterterrorism. New police academy graduates do not receive the originally envisioned field training by International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) due to the current security situation, so new police receive informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police.

Police are recruited through a combination of methods depending on the stability of the province in which they live. In stable provinces, recruiting is done by MOI, community leaders, IPLOs, and Multinational Force Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). In areas where insurgents are more active, the MSCs play a larger role in recruitment. The Iraqi police advertise for recruits via radio, posters, police stations, and employment centers. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the local area; however, all police must commit to serving anywhere in the nation if necessary.

Police recruits undergo a physical fitness test, medical examination and background check; increasingly, more sophisticated vetting tools are being developed and employed. Vetting is performed by the MSCs and, on a more limited basis, by an assessment tool developed by an MNSTC-I contractor that screens for literacy, cognitive, and suitability characteristics.

MSCs have increasingly engaged Iraqi Police Service Chiefs in the review of the police candidate rosters. The MOI and MNSTC-I's Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) are working closely together to conduct training and deploy IPS in-processing teams (vetting teams). These in-processing teams will deploy to Al Kut, Basrah, Al Hillah, and Mosul police academies. This process should be complete by November 2005, and thereafter police candidates will be vetted by MOI. The MOI Qualifying Committee has received information on 120,000 MOI employees, and a final screening process has been completed on 90,000 of them. The work of the Qualifying Committee to weed out "ghost employees" (who are being paid but not working) and other police who do not meet minimal standards is ongoing.

The IPS uses a variety of equipment, including Chevy Luv and Nissan pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The goal is for each police officer and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment.

The rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion in the IPS varies by province. Most police units have experienced a decrease in absenteeism as the number of trained police has increased. The exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. Effectiveness of the Iraqi police officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command. The P3 teams are focusing their efforts on developing capability at the provincial police headquarters and MOI in a top-down approach.

**Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP).** The IHP has about 1,400 members trained and on duty. IHP officers attend a 21-day training program that covers basic policing, driving skills, convoy escort, and weapons qualification with pistol, rifle, and machine gun.

The IHP officers use a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

The IHP does not have a TRA at this time. The goal for recruiting is a minimum of 300 cadets monthly until a force of 6,300 is built. All IHP patrolpersons and officers graduate from the four-week IHP Academy. The equipment goal for is for each patrolperson and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment. The IHP will start working with the U.S. Military Police Brigade in Baghdad in July 2005 to develop individual and squad skills and defined goals

**Civil Intervention Force (CIF).** There are three main CIF elements: the ERU, the 8th Mechanized Police, and the Public Order Brigade (POB).

Each type of CIF receives different training. The ERU personnel receive a four-week basic and four-week advanced Crisis Response Training (CRT) course. Selected individuals will go through a five-week Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training course. The 8th Mechanized Brigade receives a six-week training course. Selected personnel attend an Operator and Maintenance course at Taji for the Armored Security Vehicles. Lastly, the POB receives a six-week training course at Numaniyah Training Base.

The CIF use a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The 8th Mechanized Brigade uses BTR armored personnel carriers with 23mm cannon. Each battalion and member is currently equipped with all mission-essential equipment.

The SPTTs embedded with the 8th Mechanized Brigade and the battalions of the Public Order Brigade submit a TRA at least monthly on the same areas as do the Army Military Transition Teams. The SPTTs are focusing their efforts on mentoring the cadres with the least experience. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the unit with that of the area in which it is deployed. The first three Public Order Battalions were brought into the ISF without CPATT-developed training. The 4th Public Order Battalion completed training last month. Each battalion is equipped with all mission-essential equipment. These units should be fully trained and equipped by the fall of 2005. Notably, the ERU has a miniscule AWOL/attrition rate. The 8th Mechanized Brigade has a moderate rate, and the Public Order Battalions experience AWOL and attrition rates that are inversely proportional to their pay and training. Candidates for CIF are recruited from the surrounding police stations and provinces.

As with other police units, the exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. A vetting process is used to screen out foreign elements. The effectiveness of the Iraqi police officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command.

**Special Police Commandos.** There are over 8,000 trained Special Police Commandos on duty. Special Police Commando recruits, who typically are seasoned military veterans, receive training for three weeks within their units concentrating on individual weapons instruction and light infantry tactics; they receive no police training. Training has been conducted for the most part at their bases, but the Coalition has just completed a new four-week basic training academy for new recruits; the first class of 97 students graduated on June 23, 2005. Subsequent classes are planned for 250 students. The program of instruction includes training in basic marksmanship, medical first aid training, tactics training, land navigation training, and drill and ceremony.

Members of the Special Police Commandos are recruited by the MOI. Individuals are screened by the Commandos' chain of command with emphasis on non-sectarian and non-political loyalty to the country and government of Iraq. Individuals are also screened by the Qualifying Committee to insure that no recruit is inducted who has a criminal record or a history of participation in terrorist activities.

The Special Police Commandos' equipment is non-U.S. in origin with the exception of the primary tactical vehicles. Small arms and crew-served are principally Eastern-bloc AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and RPK and PKM light machine guns. The Special Police Commandos are also equipped with Glock pistols. Most organizational clothing and individual equipment is manufactured in Iraq. The Special Police Commandos are scheduled to receive 60 ten-passenger armored cars.

SPTTs submit a TRA for Special Police Commandos at least monthly covering the same categories as the Army TRAs.

The training goals for the Special Police Commandos include: conducting training at individual, leader, staff, and collective level; and continuing to develop a mission-essential task list including conducting a raid, conducting cordon and search, and defending a fixed site. The equipment goal is for each unit to have at least 70 percent of its authorized equipment by October 2005.

Although exact rates of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion, the overall rate of loss of personnel from these categories is below 10 percent. The extent of insurgent infiltration is low based on the chain of commands' direct involvement in recruiting and the Qualifying Committee's process to screen potential members of the Special Police Commandos. The Special Police Commando chain of command is assessed as highly effective.

**Border Police.** To date, more than 15,500 Border Police have been trained. The Border Police receive training in small unit patrolling, vehicle search, personnel search, rights of the individual, life saving, Iraqi Border Law, handling of detainees, and weapons. Border police equipment includes Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

Currently, the ISF do not have a system in place to track the Border Police's readiness and capabilities. The goal is for each member and station to be equipped with mission-essential

equipment. No estimate exists on the percentage of desertion and absenteeism, although we know that the Border Police has experienced a significant rate of attrition. The extent of insurgent infiltration varies by province. In some areas of the border, there appears to be a high level of insurgent infiltration.

The effectiveness of the Border Police officer cadres and the chain of command varies widely but is generally moderate to low. An effort has been ongoing to energize the Border Police leadership and recruit for the Border Police Academy.

**Provincial Emergency Battalions.** The Provincial Emergency Battalion units are formed by the local Chiefs of Police without Coalition Forces' involvement. To date, CPATT has not conducted training for these units and has not provided equipment or supplies. If these units join a recognized MOI unit, then they would receive full training and supplies.

**Provincial Special Weapons and Training (SWAT).** Provincial SWAT teams have been formed by some governors and provincial police chiefs. In addition to standard police basic training, the provincial SWAT teams receive four weeks of training consisting of Human Relations and Police Conduct, Firearms Training (with AK-47 assault rifles and Glock pistols), Mechanical Breaching (e.g., multiple entry, multiple rooms), and Specialty Training – Sniper Training, Offensive Driving, Intelligence, and Surveillance. Recruits are drawn from existing IPS officers selected by IPLOs assigned to the province of origin. These forces mainly use Chevy Luv pickups, AK-47s and Glock pistols. These forces are first trained to a basic level and are receiving additional practical skills training. Currently, new SWAT personnel are recruited only as replacements for existing SWAT teams. An increase in specialized training is required. The Provincial SWAT team assessments are included with the Provincial Police TRAs.

The rate of absenteeism varies by province for the police service. The extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. A vetting process is used to screen out foreign elements and criminals. The effectiveness of the Provincial SWAT chain of command also varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command.

### *Militia Integration*

More than a dozen militias have been documented in Iraq. Under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91, the Transformation and Reintegration Plan and Article 27(B) of the TAL, a total of 9 of these were to be integrated into the ISF. Of these only the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmergas and the Badr Organization (formerly Badr Corps) remain as significant entities. The other six organizations have either disbanded their militias or have assigned them to personal security duties. The Mahdi Army under Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr is not part of this integration. The ITG and its predecessor have had some success in integrating militias into the ISF, but militia elements integrated into the ISF typically remain within preexisting organizational structures and retain their original loyalties or affiliations.